



Version of attached le:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cohen, Gidon and Flinn, Andrew and Mates, Lewis (2008) 'Political Culture and the Post-War Labour Party:
Values, Practices and Activism in South Lewisham Labour Party, 1948-71.', Socialist History, 32 . pp. 59-83.





The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
https://dro.dur.ac.uk
 
Political Culture and the Post-war 
Labour Party 
 
Values, Practices and Activism in South Lewisham, 
1948–71 
 
Gidon Cohen, Andrew Flinn and Lewis Mates 
 
‘A Party lives—or dies—on the quality and number of its active supporters. 
It has been our constant endeavour to find more and better workers for our 
Cause. To-day we find ourselves with an excellent band of trained and enthusiastic 
workers ready for the coming fight. For Labour is now on the forward 
march.’1 This hyperbolic claim, made in 1954 by the South Lewisham Labour 
Party (SLLP), nevertheless captures something of the importance of 
membership to one constituency party. It points to one reason why amongst 
historians and political scientists there has been longstanding interest in local 
Labour politics, originating in part from the claim that the national trajectories 
cannot be understood in isolation from local events and 
developments.2 Yet discussions of local political parties, although in many 
cases making extensive reference to activists, have at the centre of their 
concern an ‘institution’. Thus, it is only in the past few years that the specific 
concern with patterns of Labour Party membership and activism has 
emerged amongst historians.3 
 
This paper stems from a larger project which aims to develop new quantitative 
ways of examining patterns of membership and activism, using a case 
study of the South Lewisham Labour Party, Labour’s largest constituency 
party for much of the immediate post-war period.4 However, our purpose 
here is with more qualitative understandings. In this paper, we examine one 
significant way of looking at grassroots activism, using the concept of ‘political 
culture’, advanced by, among others, Lawrence Black in Old Labour, New 
Britain? The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951–64.5 Reflecting 
on the fortunes of the left generally, including the Labour Party, in the 1950s 
and 1960s, Black argues that ‘[f]ar from being the passive beneficiaries of 
change, Conservative success was worked-for, not inherited from social and 
economic forces. Likewise the left’s hard times under affluence were largely 
of its own making.’6 According to this argument, the reasons for Labour’s 
decline in membership and activism and its electoral failure can be found 
not so much in external factors but rather in the internal ‘political culture’ 
of the party. Black explicitly discusses the concept of political culture only 
briefly, with the suggestion that it is constituted of ways of thinking, associated 
with both ‘informal, instinctive and ethical impulses’ and ‘formal or 
explicitly ideological reasoning’. Elsewhere he refers to the ‘culture of politics’ 
as ‘its instincts, conduct, style and remit of its influence in the wider 
culture’.7 More about his understanding of the concept can be inferred from 
the development of the argument in the rest of the book which looks in 
some detail at Labour (and Communist) branch life, identifying some significant 
problems of organisation including the small numbers of those 
actively involved, regular changes and upheavals in terms of personnel, meetings 
dominated by organisational matters rather than politics, the 
concomitant low attendances, inactivity and apathy, as well as the often poor 
and shabby condition of party and branch premises. The book examines the 
dysfunctional relationship between the Labour Party and young people and 
the way in which this manifested itself through the prevalence of ‘socialist 
squares’ within the party’s youth organisation and through disagreements and 
conflicts about the use of leisure time.8 The book also discusses Labour’s 
response to affluence, their rejection of consumption as the solution to 
society’s problems and concerns about popular or ‘Americanised’ culture in 
particular commercial television and the passivity and lack of engagement 
engendered by television viewing.9 The final chapters consider the nature of 
moral thinking within the Labour Party, arguing that all of Labour’s 
thinkers—revisionists included—adopted a ‘persistently ethical tone rather 
than the empirical, non-ideological and state-driven, top-down aspects 
many commentators have chosen to emphasize’. Black identifies this dominant 
attitude as a key factor in explaining the party’s reluctance to engage 
with the developing field of political marketing.10 The description of political 
culture as outlined here thus seems to incorporate a number of different 
elements, including sets of activities and practices, often in a formal institutional 
context (particularly at local level), as well as associated sets of 
mentalities, or ways of thinking. The search then is not for a coherent political 
philosophy but rather much more generalised inferences about 
motivations and patterns of thought: 
 
The dusty realms of branch life disclose not coherent ideologies, but 
informal ways of thinking, moral imperatives and established mores of 
political activity. Something of the diversity is scrutinized—how the associational 
often prevailed over the more explicitly ‘political’; how ‘apathy’, 
while real enough in the 1950s, was also a consequence of activists’ imagination;  
how organization could shield socialists from as much as connect 
them to their audience.11  
The book also suggests that this political culture should be given a central 
explanatory role: ‘the contradiction in Labour’s status as a mass party, yet 
one whose local organisation was palpably decrepit, was to be explained less 
by a centralized power structure or by trade union influence, than by the 
prevailing party culture.’12 
 
Taking Black’s work as a starting point, this article provides an examination 
of the political culture of the South Lewisham party. After a brief 
presentation of some background on South Lewisham, it discusses in turn 
the party’s institutions, policy and lower level activities, particularly political 
education and socialising. In each case, we consider how the evidence 
suggests ways to understand the values and practices that inform our understanding 
of political culture. Pointing to the patterns of typicality and 
atypicality of activities, practices and results in South Lewisham, we argue 
for a need to rethink the nature of ‘political culture’ and the methods by 
which historians might examine and understand it. Combining what we argue 
is a largely atypical picture of internal political culture with the rather typical 
trajectory of SLLP in other respects, we also argue that the internal culture 
of political parties may in fact play a rather small part in explaining broader 
patterns of success and failure. 
 
The South Lewisham Labour Party 
South Lewisham Labour Party was clearly not a typical constituency party. 
For one thing, its MP when the seat was created in 1948 was Herbert 
Morrison, architect of Labour’s strategy in London and, in his own mind— 
if not Attlee’s—Labour’s next leader. Apart from its high profile MP, the 
SLLP’s most distinctive feature was its extraordinary mass membership. Even 
before the war, its predecessor party, the East Lewisham Divisional Labour 
Party, in common with the neighbouring parties in Woolwich, was known 
for its organisation and large membership concentrated on the new estates. 
In 1945, East Lewisham had 2,000 members rising rapidly to 5,000 by 1947. 
After boundary changes in 1948, which resulted in the formation of the 
South Lewisham constituency, the local party continued to grow in size. In 
1952, the year when Labour’s membership peaked nationally, South 
Lewisham had 7,110 members, rising to 7,600 a year later. It was by some 
distance the largest party in the country. Few other parties came close. 
Woolwich East had nearly 6,000 members in 1953, and other parties such 
as Bexley and Chislehurst in Kent, and Lanark, Taunton and Salford West 
elsewhere, achieved memberships in excess of 5,000, but these were exceptional. 
More typically, constituency party memberships, even at the high point 
of Labour’s membership nationally, ranged from less than 1,000 to 3,000.13 
Whilst the level of constituency membership was exceptionally high, the 
broad pattern of its trajectory was not unusual. As Labour’s national 
membership fell over the subsequent years so did the South Lewisham 
party’s and, by 1970, it had just 2,072 members. 
 
Part of the reason for this extraordinary membership was the personnel 
involved in Lewisham and the concentration they placed on membership and 
model organisation in Lewisham. For most of this period, Morrison’s closet 
local allies were the husband and wife team of Jim and Mabel Raisin. 
Previously active together in Woolwich, they moved to Lewisham in 1933, 
with Jim Raisin acting as party secretary and agent and Mabel full-time 
‘(unpaid) deputy’. When Jim was promoted to London District Organiser 
in 1946, he was succeeded in Lewisham as secretary and agent by Mabel. 
Both, like Morrison, were convinced of the need to build local parties with 
‘big memberships’, and together they constructed a local party machine that 
in many ways was the blue-print for the organisational model recommended 
by the Labour Party but rarely achieved in London or elsewhere. 
According to Tom Jeffery, this ‘conscious and concentrated effort’ involved 
the creation and maintenance of a local party apparatus which went down 
to the street level (‘street captains’), regular and centrally directed canvassing 
and a programme of social, sporting and educational activities. The advances 
of the post-World War Two years were built on the foundations laid by ‘the 
vigorous work of the pioneers of the East Lewisham Labour Party, including 
Mr and Mrs Raisin’ during the 1930s.14 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Lewisham was largely a 
middle class and clerical worker dormitory suburb, but a number of demographic 
changes over the next 50 to 60 years substantially altered the 
character of the borough. Chief among these changes were the interwar 
construction of large-scale London County Council (LCC) cottage estates 
in the south of the borough (the Bellingham and Downham estates), the 
arrival of a substantial black, mainly Jamaican population in the 1950s and 
1960s, and the incorporation of the more conventionally inner-city areas of 
Deptford into the borough in the 1960s. These changes were reflected in 
fluctuations in electoral fortunes in the borough. For the first half of the 
twentieth century, Lewisham returned Conservative MPs and controlled the 
local council. Labour first established a foothold in the borough only with 
the building of the LCC estates which, between 1921 and 1931, increased 
the population of Lewisham by over 25 per cent, mostly in the new wards 
of Downham and Bellingham. These new estates were largely populated by 
people from outside Lewisham, including the docks and riverside areas of 
Deptford, Southwark, Bermondsey, and Rotherhithe.15 
 
At the 1945 election, Labour won the two Lewisham seats, East and West, 
for the first time. Morrison won East Lewisham by the large margin of 15,000 
votes, over-turning the previous Conservative majority of 6,000. Arthur 
Skeffington, in West Lewisham, won a much closer contest by only 2,500 votes. 
The scale of Morrison’s victory reflected not only his successful wooing of 
the black-coated and middle-class electorate of suburban Lewisham but also 
the real Labour strongholds in the south of the constituency on the LCC 
estates. Boundary changes in 1948 then transformed Lewisham’s two seats into 
three—creating two Conservative? Labour marginals (West Lewisham and 
North Lewisham) and further concentrating the core Labour vote in 
Morrison’s new seat of South Lewisham.16 With some fluctuations in the vote, 
notably in 1959 when Morrison’s successor Carol Johnson’s majority fell from 
6,000 to 3,000, Labour continued to safely hold the seat until it was once again 
dissolved by boundary changes and the constituency of East Lewisham was 
re-created shortly before the February 1974 election. 
 
Results of London and borough elections confirm Lewisham as divided 
electorally. Control of the local council, at least until Deptford’s traditional 
Labour voting-wards were incorporated into Lewisham in 1964, switched 
back and forth between Labour and Conservatives. Again, Labour’s strongholds 
were in the south. From 1928 onwards, Downham and Bellingham 
wards consistently returned (sometimes the only) Labour candidates to the 
council. After the 1945 general election, Labour took control of the 
Lewisham Borough Council for the first time. Control was short-lived and, 
in 1949, the party only retained 11 of its previous 40 seats. Conservative 
hopes that this result might presage ‘Mr Herbert Morrison’s ìsafeî 
constituency…drifting gratifyingly towards the borderline’ turned out to be 
overly optimistic.17 In fact, all the 11 seats that Labour had retained were in 
the wards of South Lewisham—specifically Bellingham (3), Grove Park (3), 
Southend (3) and Whitefoot (2), once again indicating the location of 
Labour’s core support. In wards such as Bellingham and Grove Park, 
Labour received 70–80 per cent of the total votes cast. The results of 1945 
and 1949 set the pattern for the coming decade with the council regularly 
changing hands. A similar pattern can be discerned in the LCC elections; 
Lewisham had nine representatives—three from each constituency. While 
the Conservatives frequently won the seats in North and West, South 
Lewisham always returned three Labour councillors 
 
Institutions 
In terms of formal organisation, the SLLP had at its centre a General 
Council (GC), which was responsible for the management of the party and 
decided on its policies. Despite occasional complaints in the later 1960s 
about the frequency of meetings, it met regularly once a month. The 
Executive Committee, with members appointed from the General Council, 
was responsible for the day-to-day operations between GC meetings. 
However, the main focus of activity for members was in the ward committees. 
Ward level activities were organised by the officers, generally a chairman, 
secretary, treasurer and two or three polling district officers. Largely co-ordinated 
from the party centre, but in co-operation with the wards, the SLLP 
collectors provided the main form of contact which most members had with 
the party through their routine collections. 
 
Formal institutions such as these relate to the study of the political culture 
of local parties in at least two respects. First, the structure enabled and 
rewarded certain types of activity and attitudes, whilst preventing or penalising 
others. They present important constraints which any study of the 
culture of local politics must recognise. Second, these organisational structures 
are regularised activities or practices that have both actual and symbolic 
significance and hence may be taken to reflect, or even on some accounts 
to embody, the culture of the party. Such an account can only ever be partial: 
the design or emergence of local parties’ structures in many respects tells 
us more about the values of the party nationally; after all, the organisational 
structure described above to a very great degree simply replicated the model 
rules designed for constituency Labour parties by the national organisation. 
As such may be thought to tell us relatively little specifically about the culture 
of the local party. Nevertheless, the extent to which a local party was able 
or willing to follow the prescribed structures is in of itself potentially 
revealing. In particular, South Lewisham’s ability to sustain a model, which 
both adhered to and deviated from the national norms, and the ways in 
which these formal institutions were negotiated and argued about, including 
disputes with the national and London party organisations, raises some interesting 
questions about the influence of local political cultures. 
 
Perhaps the most significant deviation from a typical Labour constituency 
organisation is precisely in the close relationship between the model structure 
and the implementation in Lewisham. In many constituency parties the 
formal organisational structures below constituency level had little real existence. 
This was not the case in South Lewisham where implementation was 
taken very seriously and organisation was central to the ethos of the local 
arty. Indeed, in many ways South Lewisham provided the model upon 
which the rules were based or first tested. Strenuous efforts were made to 
retain a full structure of the street-level captains throughout the period of 
the party. In general, the party operated at near to full coverage, with urgent 
efforts made to rectify shortfalls when they did occur.18 Although there is 
some evidence that achieving this became significantly more difficult in the 
late 1960s, a full list of positions in the constituency from 1967 shows 
remarkably few vacancies.19 This broad picture of adherence to national 
party’s recommended structures provides one backdrop to understanding the 
culture of the party—which emphasises the importance that such institutional 
arrangements were accorded within the South Lewisham Party. 
 
However, there were deviations from the model. Perhaps, most notably, 
the organisation of the party at the ground level—in terms of its collectors 
and canvassing—was under greater constituency level control than laid down 
in the model rules. Whilst in the rules canvassing and propaganda were 
primarily to be the responsibility of the wards, in South Lewisham practices 
were more centralised. Collectors’ routes were allocated centrally by the agent 
and, in one of the local innovations picked up on but not universally recommended 
by the 1955 national Wilson report on party organisation, South 
Lewisham allowed its collectors to keep a proportion of the subscriptions 
paid. Superficially, this policy appeared successful. In 1961, the scheme was 
working so well that the constituency decided to move towards paying its 
canvassing team as well. Even in the late 1960s, the party had most, if not 
all, of its routes covered and, despite criticism of the scheme elsewhere for 
subverting a ‘socialist ethos’, it did not appear particularly controversial in 
Lewisham. However, clearly the scheme did not provide the only, or even a 
major, incentive to perform this role with some choosing to donate their 
commission back to the party. In 1951, the party also established a Central 
Canvassing Corps, which provided organised direction to activity both 
during and outside of election periods.20 This ‘Socialist commando unit’, a 
group increasing in size from 20 to 35 members in the first year of operation, 
was primed, according to party and local newspaper sources, with 
up-to-date information on all policy matters. The unit selected one of the 
seven wards in the division each Monday evening, calling on all Labour voters 
on the marked electoral register, recruiting 845 new members in just two 
months in 1952.21 The emphasis placed on such centralising initiatives and 
the effort the GC claimed it was making to get the corps to be ‘an influence 
within the party’ reflected a pride in not just any set of institutions, but rather 
in structures that could be seen to be effective in meeting their stated aims. 
The central direction of these processes also flows from the primary impor- 
tance placed on the establishment and retention of effective organisational 
and membership structures by successive secretary-agents, the Raisins and 
then Cyril Hillam. 
 
Central then to the political culture of the Lewisham party, as reflected 
in its formal institutions, is an intense pride in these institutions—a pride 
which developed out of a sense that these arrangements were not arbitrary, 
but were effective because they worked. Such background values are perhaps 
even more explicitly reflected in the aspects of the party’s activity that were 
much less successful, particularly in the organisation of youth and women. 
In these initiatives, the South Lewisham party grappled with the recommendations 
of the national party, but with the same largely disappointing 
results also apparent nationally leading to revealing tensions. 
 
There seems to have been a genuine commitment on the part of the party 
to support both youth and women’s political activity. At its very first 
meeting, and under the guidance of its full-time secretary and election agent 
Mabel Raisin, the new South Lewisham constituency party made the organisation 
of women, especially young women, a priority.22 In 1954 Morrison 
argued that the party’s future lay in the education of politically aware generations 
of young people: 
 
[Young people] are vital to the future of the Labour and Socialist cause. 
Upon their knowledge, education, reading and capacity in political organisation 
and the exposition of Constructive Socialist thought much, very 
much, depends for our Party and our country.23 
 
The party nevertheless struggled in its attempts to attract and retain the 
support of both women and youth. The party had between 1,000 and 2,500 
women members. In numerical terms, this was many more than most other 
constituency parties. However, this represented only 20–33 per cent of the 
party’s members, low compared with other constituency parties and perhaps 
surprising for a party which based its strength on the large residential estates 
and the co-operative movement rather than industry and trade unions. Even 
more acute were the difficulties with respect to youth with the lack of interest 
from younger voters a commonly recurring theme. These issues contributed 
to, and were reflected in, the respective institutions the party established to 
deal with youth and women’s organisation.24 
 
The first League of Youth branch in Lewisham to be reformed after the 
war was in Hither Green in 1948. By 1952 a further three branches were 
operating in South Lewisham: Rushey Green, Bellingham and Downham. 
However, by the mid-1950s, when the national party decided to disband the 
League as a semi-independent organisation and reorganise League branches 
as local sections of the adult party, only one, Hither Green, was still functioning. 
Even this branch struggled and, by 1957, it had ceased as a political 
body and continued to meet only as a social club.25 
 
In 1959, following Labour’s third straight general election defeat, the party 
became increasingly concerned about how it was losing the youth vote to a 
Conservative Party seemingly more in tune with the desires and aspirations 
of young people.26 The establishment of a new youth organisation, the semiindependent 
Young Socialists (YS), launched in 1960 was one of the 
suggestions advanced to address this apparent disadvantage. However, like 
similar initiatives, the YS were soon beset by political and organisational difficulties. 
In South Lewisham, the problems were not so much 
political—though the influence of ‘pressure groups’ like CND and of 
‘visiting political undesirables’ occasioned some concern—but the lack of 
political activity within the branch and the kind of behaviour which the party 
believed resulted from its programme of primarily social activities. The local 
YS branch developed out of a youth club initiative designed to bring the 
party into contact with local young people. The party agreed to spend the 
not-inconsiderable sum of £57 on table tennis tables, dart-boards, football 
and netball equipment, but this expenditure came with strings: the 
constituency party stressed that the Young Socialists must ‘justify by their 
acts this expenditure by the Party’.27 
 
Unfortunately, the YS was unable to live up to these expectations. A 
‘majority of members’ opposed any attempt to introduce political discussion 
into meetings. Worse, on several occasions branch nights were marred 
by fights, damage to property and theft—the embarrassing details of which 
made their way into the local press.28 Although non-party members using 
the social facilities caused much of the trouble, part of the problem lay in 
the difficulty of obtaining capable youth leaders. Thus, supervision by adult 
party members was necessary. The branch was disbanded and re-launched 
on several occasions with new leaders in place but with little success. Only 
towards the end of the decade did the local YS seem to take on a more stable 
and political character. Yet, even then, the small numbers involved made 
sustained political activity difficult.29 
 
As with youth, the organising of women was a priority at the formation 
of the constituency. However, the efforts of the party to establish sustained 
separate women’s institutions were a similar failure. By 1952, the party had 
five Women’s Sections or branches (in Bellingham, Southend, Grove Park, 
Catford and St Andrews) as well as at the insistence of the London Labour 
Party, a Central Women’s Committee. But the following year two had been 
wound up and by 1957, in an echo the local League of Youth’s fate, the final 
women’s section in Bellingham had been formally disbanded, continuing to 
meet merely as a discussion and social group.30 Further attempts to organise 
women, at least in separate sections within the party, met with little success. 
Indeed, by far the most stable and long-lived women’s organisations within 
the local labour movement were the Co-operative Women’s Guilds, particularly 
the Rushey Green Guild, which had been active in local Labour politics 
since the 1920s. This would suggest that those structures that were the most 
successful were those organisations with a history and clear political and 
organisational focus rather than those which were formed in response to 
central urgings. 
 
These efforts at establishing institutions to promote youth and women’s 
participation revealed some attempt to follow the models established higher 
up within the party, at regional or national level. Yet, in contrast to the other 
institutions discussed, they were not perceived as effective.Where this basic 
requirement was not met, the party was happy to drop its status as a model 
party. The party followed every national initiative on the organisation of 
young people but, like the national picture, none of these initiatives were 
sustained or a success. Proposals for a central branch to co-ordinate youth 
activities across Lewisham were abandoned ‘in the absence of any 
evidence…that a sufficient number of young people were interested enough 
in the formation of another branch of the League’. As with national Labour, 
one senses a lack of conviction with regard to the purpose and efficacy of 
youth organisation not apparent elsewhere in SLLP organisation. Similarly, 
when structures for women’s organisations, imposed according to the model 
set out by the London Labour Party, failed, the response was even more 
robust. Mabel Raisin wanted her ‘severe criticism’ placed on record: ‘We have 
always held in this party, that before forming any additional unit it was first 
necessary to find not only officers, but suitable persons to manage the 
Committee when formed’.31 There may have been pride in the model structure 
and operation of the formal institutions of the party, but it was an 




The party’s formal institutions provide an important starting point for examining 
the political culture of local Labour parties, both as a backdrop and as 
an indication of some of the party member’s central values. However, the 
more explicit pronouncements on political issues, and related claims made 
by members, provide an obvious counterpoint for assessing the kinds of 
issues that motivated the party membership. 
Politically, the dominant forces in the constituency identified closely with 
their most famous MP, Herbert Morrison. Like Morrison, in the 1950s the 
local party tended to advocate a gradualist approach to politics, advocating 
consolidation of Labour’s achievements rather than agitating for further 
radical change. Concentrating on local issues, the party opposed the kind of 
radicalism and division that might threaten Labour’s electoral alliance, 
seeking at all times to present the voters with a united face. 
As with most constituency parties, the most-discussed policy issues were 
those of local significance, particularly housing (including rent rises and the 
ownership of the housing stock), education and other local services and the 
cost of public transport.32 In internal party elections (for the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) or for the London Labour Party executive), the 
party voted for loyalist or right-wing candidates. Among the delegates to the 
General Council, there was always a left-wing grouping, but it was always 
only a minority and candidates associated with the left and Bevanism such 
as Richard Crossman, Barbara Castle and even, in the early 1950s, Harold 
Wilson, did not receive majority support among GC delegates until well into 
the 1960s when they had become leading and mainstream members of the 
national party. The ‘lefts’ defeat of Morrison in the constituency section of 
the NEC in 1952 particularly incensed many senior officials in the local party 
and it responded by issuing a leaflet about Morrison entitled ‘A Great 
Londoner’ to all party members in South Lewisham. As well as emphasising 
the personal contribution that Morrison had made to the party, the leaflet 
characterised his opponents as a collection of ‘near-Communists, the pacifists, 
the temperamental anarchists, the ìclear-out-of-everywhereî school’ and 
likened Bevan’s conference rhetoric to that of Stalin ‘working up to a ìpurgeî 
of “traitors”’.33 The local left, and perhaps others who felt that this to be 
too inflammatory and too factional, sent in resolutions stressing the need 
for unity and an end to all personal attacks on members, although the 
Executive judged that the officers had ‘acted in good faith’.34 
One of the most important developments in post-war Lewisham was the 
arrival of significant numbers of black immigrants from Jamaica and elsewhere. 
Although there was little immediate impact on the LCC and Greater 
London Council (GLC) estates in the wards which made up the South 
Lewisham constituency (most of the new population initially found accommodation 
in the privately rented properties to the centre and north of the 
borough), racism and race relations were issues that concerned political 
parties locally and nationally.35 The response of the South Lewisham party 
to the issue illustrates the already noted desire to maximise the appearance 
of unity and downplaying of controversial issues. It was not that the party 
was totally unwilling to take a stand on these matters, and indeed some 
sought to play a positive role, organising meetings on ‘racial unity’ and 
opposing the government’s immigration legislation as discriminatory. 
Nevertheless, there was clear evidence of dissenting voices within the local 
labour movement, with affiliated trade union branches passing resolutions 
opposing ‘unrestricted’ immigration or condemning government moves ‘to 
provide equal opportunity in employment and housing irrespective of 
colour’. While the party did not support such resolutions, the awareness of 
divergent views on the subject persuaded leading figures to play down the 
significance of any local problems. In the words of one leading local official, 
it was best to ‘go easy on this question generally as there appeared to 
be no problem of integration in Lewisham, and at times well meant action 
only tended to create a problem.’36 
 
Political discussion within the South Lewisham party may thus seem rather 
limited, uncontroversial and focussed on local issues, and that was certainly 
the public perception that the party was keen to foster. The SLLP line invariably 
emphasised unity and support for the national leadership around the 
principles of ‘socialism’. Indeed, the concept of ‘socialism’, though never 
clearly defined and certainly not imbued with any real radical intent, provided 
a number of the few occasions on which (relatively mild) criticism of the 
national organisation were articulated. After the national victories in 1964 
and 1966, the Lewisham party argued that the Labour government had not 
been sufficiently bold in distancing itself from the policies of previous 
Conservative administrations and occasionally registered their disappointment 
on policies with regard to industrial relations, the railways and 
prescription charges. Late on in the life of the Labour government, the SLLP 
called for more ‘socialism’ when making decisions in the future, a much more 
redistributive taxation system and a significant increase in overseas aid.37 Put 
this way, the idea of ‘socialism’ and opposition to Conservatism gave the 
party a sense of internal cohesion whilst providing the basis for policy direction. 
Yet, in order to perform this function, socialism itself had to remain 
largely unexamined and undefined. When the content of socialism itself 
became the focus for attention, it could not serve its usual unifying purpose. 
Such divisions were, for example, made explicit in the request by Bellingham 
ward for the party to submit a resolution to national conference calling for 
support for ‘democratic socialism’. The resolution spelt out what such a 
focus would require, including a commitment to Clause 4, the extension of 
democracy by the NEC and a campaign of political education in party, 
industry and nation. The local leadership neutered the resolution by replacing 
the specifics with the general ‘desire to take a further step towards democratic 
socialism’ and saw the resolution adopted. The controversial nature of 
the understanding of ‘socialism’ was revealed in the narrow margin by which 
it was passed.38 
 
This evidence provides some indication of the values that motivated party 
members. Attempts to transform or even influence national party policy were 
infrequent and issues of ‘high’ or national politics were not the primary 
concern of party activity. This loyalism and the relative absence of policy 
discussion were indicative of two things. First, constituency party activists 
did not see their primary responsibilities in terms of the making of policy— 
national or local. Rather they perceived their purpose in terms of enabling 
achievement of the goals that they accepted were articulated by the national 
leadership. Second, and as significantly, the absence of vigorous debate in 
many arenas was due in part to active political management. The 
constituency leadership believed that dissent and disagreement would have 
negative consequences for party activity and the party’s electoral prospects 
with any signs of disunity being exploited by the local Tory-inclined press. 
Hence, party leaders sometimes acted to prevent the expression of minority 
viewpoints—delegates to the national party conference were to speak and 
vote on behalf of the whole party and, as in 1954, only allowed to speak if 
their ‘views expressed the considered opinion of all three delegates’.39 Such 
concerns with the value of unity and agreement can be perceived in part in 
the relative lack of debate. But we also know that this appearance of unity 
was partly an artificial construct, managed by the party for public consumption, 
because on occasions the façade cracked to reveal real political divisions 
that could not be avoided. 
 
While a minority, there was a reasonably sized left-wing group within the 
party. This was evident in the votes for NEC candidates and others but was 
also clearly discernible in the debates over the very divisive cold war issues, 
in particular nuclear disarmament. On issues such as atomic testing or 
German rearmament, the left were easily defeated. Resolutions that were critical 
of British or American foreign and defence policies were only passed 
when they had been neutered or balanced by the addition of criticisms of 
the Soviet Union. On disarmament, any resolution that called for unilateral 
action by the British or Americans was amended to the multilateral position 
favoured by the party leadership.40 After the decision of the 1960 Labour 
Party annual conference to support unilateral disarmament, the SLLP leadership 
acted to minimise the divisions within its own membership. The 
party’s delegates had been mandated to vote against unilateralism at the 
conference and afterwards some leading figures made clear their support for 
Gaitskell’s determination to overturn the decision. Others, aware of the divisions 
on this issue within SLLP, advocated a tactical silence to promote party 
unity. Eventually, however, public discussion was forced on the issue and the 
Executive issued a statement which, while recognising that the party’s 
annual conference was ‘the policy making body of the Party’, reserved the 
right for ‘constituencies, affiliated organisations or individuals’ to disagree 
with such democratically made decisions and ‘to attempt to change the policy 
by democratic means within the organisation’.41 
 
It is clear that the divisions between left and right were at this time very 
sharp and the party leaders feared the effect on the party’s ability to function 
effectively. Party secretary and agent Cyril Hillam (he had succeeded 
Mabel Raisin in 1960) indicated his fears and priorities when he claimed that 
the constituency party’s work was not being hampered by any disunity and 
that the debate had been carried on a ‘comradely sprit and with sincerity of 
purpose’ with both sides working together on canvassing campaigns ‘united 
in their efforts to forward the work of the party’.42 The reality was that significant 
political tensions—and in some cases physical intimidation—were a 
part of SLLP meetings at this time. One constituency activist complained 
of the ‘barrage of abuse’ aimed at some speakers, particularly younger ones, 
at General Council meetings; another GC delegate and CND supporter 
claimed that he had been assaulted by a senior member and elected councillor 
who had sought to stop him from selling copies of Peace News outside 
a meeting.43 A special internal report into the conduct of meetings sought 
to break down the barriers between the political blocks, criticising behaviour 
at party meetings and instructing members to end the practice of sitting 
‘in blocks of “left”, “right”, “centre” or “what have you” [as it] often engenders 
ill will and misunderstanding that would not otherwise arise’. The goal 
of party management was to direct and stimulate activity, and this might, and 
sometimes did, mean not airing the sources of disagreement. The report 
urged members to behave reminding them that ‘at the end of the day, let us 
remain true friends and comrades in the movement.’44 
 
Wards, organisation, education and fellowship 
If we are to understand the values and practices of the constituency party, 
it is of course essential to look beyond the rather narrow confines of official 
institutions and policy, to consider the internal life of the party, 
particularly at ward level. For most activists the ward was the focus of their 
engagement, but what this entailed varied considerably. The functions of 
ward organisation identified in Labour’s Party Organisation pamphlet 
included recruiting new members, retaining and servicing existing members, 
maintaining up-to-date membership lists, organising regular and effective 
meetings, collecting subscriptions, delivering party information and literature 
to members, and maintaining a marked register of electors. These 
explicitly political activities were to be supplemented by a social side ‘for 
fellowship and making money’.45 
 
In South Lewisham, the co-ordination of the canvassing and collecting 
activity was directed at constituency level by successive secretary-agents. 
Although this centralisation stemmed from the priority of efficiency, these 
activities remained vital to the life of the ward because they were implemented 
by activists whose primary sphere of activity remained largely their 
local ward. Canvassing was not, as the SLLP’s journal Digest noted, ‘like 
selling vacuum cleaners or brushes, even the most unintelligent folk know 
the uses of these things’ but ‘much more difficult because a number of ordinary 
intelligent people, men and women, still have little or no idea of 
Labour’s achievements and know even less about a future Labour 
Government’s policy’. Collecting too was regarded as ‘an important link 
between the Party and its members’, as one collector argued this was ‘not 
surprising since it is upon the subscriptions collected regularly every month 
that the very life of the Party depends’.46 With the largest individual 
membership in the country, the problems of subs collection were particularly 
acute in the South Lewisham because of the difficulties of keeping track 
of and retaining so many members. Collectors acted as a central mechanism 
for communication with members. Members’ queries covered a huge range 
of topics, but most appear to have been about party policy, closely followed 
by ‘ward questions’ such as the date of the next outing. The process was not 
just one-way communication of the party’s view; as it, too, learned from its 
members. As one collector put it ‘I often think that our Borough Council 
members could learn a lot if they were at my elbow sometimes.’47 
Membership related activities such as regular canvassing and collecting 
formed the core of ward practices. They were regarded as of great importance 
in the wards, not only in their own right but also because wards were 
the training ground for the higher level activists of the future, with new 
activists learning from old hands who ‘could fill a book on their canvassing 
experience’.48 Nevertheless, ward activities went well beyond these matters, 
which remained the province of a relatively small number of the most active 
members. 
 
Although varying considerably over the period, there were active ward 
associations in all of the constituency’s seven wards. Each of the wards held 
a monthly meeting on a weekday evening. Labour Party ward meetings have 
become notorious in writing on activism and political culture, both for the 
dismal environments in which they were generally held and for their excessive 
concern with organisational over political matters. It was certainly an 
issue that the South Lewisham party actively considered at the time. In terms 
of the surroundings, party headquarters were at 35 Brownhill Road, situated 
in Rushey Green ward, and they and the adjacent Culverly ward held their 
meetings at ‘number 35’. The party did not own properties in the other 
wards, and there was a lack of other suitable premises in the constituency. 
The other wards generally met in local schools, although it took considerable 
effort to secure these locations because they were in heavy demand for 
evening classes. Keen to stress the benefits of such an environment, the 
Digest regularly suggested that the ‘lovely’ school surroundings could also be 
considered an active part of Labour’s propaganda effort. Whitefoot ward, 
for example, ‘holds its meetings in the splendour of Catford County School, 
a fine example of Labour’s challenge to the future and a worthy setting for 
this energetic group.’49 The appearance of ‘35’ was also a matter of some 
concern. Although certainly not amongst the worst of Labour’s local 
accommodation in the early period, the property was extensively revamped 
in the late-1950s and brought up-to-date: ‘the dingy interior has given way 
to colour and brightness from a contemporary style that has evoked many 
comments, but few will dispute the lively air that has resulted.’50 It was 
considered a suitable location to entertain longstanding Swedish Social 
Democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander when he came to London as part 
of the 1959 electoral campaign and was in some demand in the 1960s from 
surrounding constituencies for their activities.51 This was at some distance 
removed from the images of Ramsay MacDonald still hanging apocryphally 
in some party offices. 
Shifting the focus of activists away from an ‘excessive concentration’ on 
organisational matters through political discussion and education was also 
an important aspiration of party life. Party meetings from constituency down 
to ward level were to be made more interesting by the discussion of policy 
issues. Stress was put on making GC meetings more ‘attractive and alive’ by 
following the executive committee report with a discussion on an aspect of 
current national party policy, led by an outside speaker or the SLLP’s Political 
Education Officer (PEO).52 Regular advertisements for, and reports of, ward 
meetings, placed stress on the political discussion there.Wards were encouraged 
to reduce the administrative or routine business of meeting and to 
devote more time to a speaker or discussions on a topical matter. Enlivening 
local meetings was essential as Mabel Raisin realised, ‘this method is, I 
believe, going to build up the interest in these monthly meetings, as only a 
tiny fraction are interested in long drawn out reports of actual party organisation, 
often given by very dull people’.53 By 1952, five of the seven wards 
held separate executive committee meetings to help reduce the time spent 
discussing organisational matters in ward meetings.54 Indeed, the question 
of political education was seen as central to the mission of the South 
Lewisham party. The conception of the mass party advocated by Morrison 
and the Raisins was not just one which enrolled large numbers, it also entailed 
the intellectual and active commitment of those members to the cause of 
Labour. In many ways this was the hardest part but, as Morrison argued, 
‘Political education and sound understanding of our vigorous party organisation 
are of real importance.We are outstanding in numbers: we must also 
be outstanding in knowledge, drive and thinking capacity’.55 
 
For this reason, the constituency PEO was seen as an important role 
within the party, often filled by high profile individuals like South Lewisham’s 
‘adopted son’ Patrick Gordon Walker, the MP for Smethwick in the late- 
1940s, and Fred Hawes, one of the London County Councillors in the 1950s, 
or ‘high-fliers’ such as Roger Godsiff, PEO from 1968 and later MP for 
Birmingham Sparkbrook. For all but relatively brief periods, there were also 
PEOs at ward level. The traditional place for political education was at the 
various ward and constituency party meetings discussed above. In addition, 
for the most active members there were area schools, run from time to time 
by the Political Education Committee.56 In the later 1950s, recognising the 
problems of working in a large party where most members did not attend 
meetings, the party began to look for alternatives, primarily through the 
development of Digest, the party magazine from 1957 and through the use 
of new technologies such as using tapes from the Labour Party’s Tape 
Library Service.57 They also experimented with open meetings of different 
types such as ‘questions meetings’, or running Tribune style ‘Brains Trust’ 
events devoted entirely to answering questions from members and the 
general public. 
 
In an otherwise very positive external report on the party’s activity in 1952, 
Jim Raisin (by then London party organiser) highlighted the SLLP’s political 
education as an area of relative weakness. This, though, was rather mild 
criticism. Raisin noted simply that central organisation was ‘somewhat 
weak’ alongside the comment that the ‘total amount’ of political education 
was ‘quite large’ in an otherwise ‘panegyric’ report that claimed, amongst 
other things, that ‘there is no aspect of party work that is not done well’.58 
However, attendance at separate political education meetings was a consistent 
problem; ‘small—often only a few “faithfuls”’ noted an early 
commentator.59 The competition with radio and, increasingly, television was 
frequently noted, the rival to a ward speaker ‘might be a boxer or stage screen 
star or even a documentary’.60 Attempts to use political discussion to attract 
attendance at ward meetings were not a success. In spite of an increased 
focus on political education and some reportedly very lively discussions and 
film shows, attendance at ward meetings in 1954 declined.61 Concern about 
the levels and effectiveness of the education being provided continued 
throughout the period. In 1962, there were calls for the PEO to be made an 
automatic member of the Executive Committee.62 In 1963, there were 
demands for an increase in political education, driven by the national party, 
to increase inner party democracy and the Young Socialists—influenced by 
the then PEO Dave Finney—passed a resolution regretting the ‘lack of 
enthusiasm’ shown by the party to ‘political education and in particular its 
failure to consider properly the annual conference agenda’.63 This pressure 
resulted in the establishment of a Political Education sub-committee, which 
considered ways to stimulate political debate without, it seems, proposing 
any radical departures.64 Shortly afterwards Finney resigned as PEO because, 
according to his successor, ‘of the lack of interest shown in political education 
activities’.65 Finney’s replacement, John Watts, also struggled to get 
people interested in political education. He focussed on increasing still 
further the political content of ward meetings (often less than half of the 
normal meeting time) and with improving the content and layout of Digest, 
although with little noticeable change to the operation of the party. In 
February 1968, he complained that he had plenty of ideas ‘but was not able 
to put them into action’ although, Watts attributed his resignation from the 
post later in the year to ‘pressures of work’.66 
 
The social side of the party activity supplemented these endeavours. 
Unlike many other constituency parties with large memberships, social 
activity was not based on a local Labour club that offered cheap beer as an 
incentive for membership. Nevertheless, the party did organise at both ward 
and constituency levels a range of social activities including dances and 
outings to the seaside and to shows. In one month in 1959, Rushey Green 
ward held a social evening for which over 150 tickets were sold, and 
arranged outings to Bexhill and Hastings. The ward was also organising a 
trip to the pantomime, ‘Humpty Dumpty’, with a strict limit of 150 tickets 
available.Whitefoot Ward held its regular dance with band at the ‘congenial’ 
Northover Hotel and Southend ward sold 100 tickets for a trip to see 
Southend lights and held their annual re-union and dance. Meanwhile a joint, 
‘Victory’ social celebrated the local election results. Even the smallest of the 
wards, Culverley, took their turn to host the combined social evening, held 
at the constituency party headquarters.67 Frequently trips were oversubscribed 
and, after complaints, disappointed members were chided, ‘it you 
want a ticket don’t wait to be asked’.68 The aim of all this, though, was political 
in two crucial respects. First, and most obviously, party finances were 
heavily dependent on the money raised by the social activities. But second, 
an active social programme was also viewed as a crucial element in attracting 
people to Labour: ‘Let’s have some real parties, it’s the cheapest way of 
getting good publicity for Labour that there is and far more cheerful than 
the gloomy if gaudy campaign the Tories are waging on the poster sites’.69 
Taken together, political education and social activities made for a fairly 
busy ward calendar. For example, Whitefoot, ‘a striking example’ of a ‘well 
organised ward’, in one fairly representative month in 1959, had talks by 
County councillors and Borough councillors—including one of the ward 
chairmen on his impressions of County Hall during his first months of 
office—and heard recordings of the Labour Party conference in addition 
to its dances and theatre trips (the major scoop that month was a blockbooking 
for ‘My Fair Lady’).70 For many activists, all this would have been 
in addition into their regular membership canvassing and collecting. 
 
Conclusion 
In assessing arguments surrounding the political culture of the post-war 
Labour Party we set ourselves two tasks. First, to describe this political 
culture and, second, to examine the extent to which this culture provided 
an important component in explaining the trajectory of other aspects of the 
party’s political fortunes. Perhaps the concept of political culture may 
appear clear enough intuitively and, despite wide-ranging debates, the task 
of defining political culture has appropriately been described as being like 
‘nailing jelly to the wall’.71 Yet, a number of general points are worth making. 
Perhaps, most obviously, if political culture is conceived of in terms of 
values and practices, it cannot be seen in singular terms but rather must 
incorporate the idea of a distribution of these, including those that are dominant 
and those that are more contested or submerged. Any discussions which 
begin to look for the political culture of a complex organisation like the 
Labour Party must be particularly careful to address this issue. The means 
by which such practices and attitudes can be uncovered needs consideration. 
In the paper we have made some suggestions as to how to read the underlying, 
often unstated assumptions, of the most active party members 
associated with the treatment of institutions, in policy statements and 
debates, and by looking at ward level organisation and political education. 
 
Implicit in this is the recognition that understanding the political culture of 
activists beyond this is a substantial challenge which may need very different 
methods. More substantially, claims about the causal impact of culture on 
other outcomes need to be carefully thought through. One route to such 
conclusions is to reconstruct the patterns of thought relating to the everyday 
life of party organisation and show how these could be related to outcomes 
of interest. Such an interpretivist approach to the study of political culture 
is particularly attractive to historians.72 Yet, where there are other contending 
explanations of things such as Labour’s electoral fortunes or falling membership, 
documenting a culture which may have reinforced such outcomes falls 
someway short of showing that these were a major explanatory factor. Such 
problems are particularly acute in the frequent cases where much of the 
evidence for particular ways of thinking is inferred from the outcomes themselves, 
or very closely related to it. This makes it important to utilize other 
forms of investigation to explore these conclusions. Such approaches may 
be possible, not least because if political culture was a major part of an explanation 
then we would expect different outcomes where cultures vary. 
Overall, the political culture of the SLLP can be compared to the 
national picture. There are many points of continuity with the national party. 
In terms of policy, positions and the value given to loyalty to ‘the party’ the 
South Lewisham party appears rather typical, although, as we argued, this 
loyalty was not blind but rather an adhesion to a set of apparently effective 
institutions. As in the rest of the party, the post-war years in South Lewisham 
were no ‘golden age’ of activism. The organisation we have documented was 
beset by an array of difficulties. Membership never seemed high enough with 
difficulties particularly acute amongst women and young people. The effort 
required to retain old members and gain new ones was a never-ending and 
exhausting one, there were frequent complaints that meetings were poorly 
attended and difficulties finding appropriate meeting spaces. Although 
finances were stable and even healthy on occasion, money remained an issue 
that augmented the party’s feeling that it never had enough activists for 
campaigning and other functions. Perhaps most problematic of all was the 
issue of political education about which there were frequent complaints, 
never fully resolved. Yet, recognition of these problems and the failures of 
the South Lewisham party to act in an appropriate manner should not 
obscure the extent to which the party had a culture that looked rather 
different from that of the party nationally. In this period, it secured the adhesion 
of both members and activists on a scale that was the envy of many 
other constituency parties and which would appear a distant memory within 
only a few years. Its activist base, although never satisfactory for the leadership,  
was substantial and those activists took a pride in their organisation 
which, in various demonstrable ways, appeared to work. Even in the problematic 
field of political education, the party had a lively calendar of events 
supplemented by an internal magazine that made it comfortably one of the 
most well organized constituency parties in the region. The political culture 
of the SLLP was in crucial ways atypical, most obviously in the core value 
placed on membership and organization in the consciousness of Lewisham 
activists. It was in these respects even an extreme case, and the culture of 
the organisation reflected this. This unusual aspect of the South Lewisham 
party was of course correlated with some success, most notably in the levels 
of membership attained. However, the overall trajectory of membership, the 
periods of rise and decline, were not at all unusual. In this respect, 
Lewisham’s rather distinctive political culture was correlated with a rather 
similar outcomes. Thus, internal political culture appeared to play a rather 
minor role in explaining these broader trajectories. 
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